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Delivering her lecture as part of the 2012 York Centre for Asian 
Research (YCAR) Urban Asia Series, Dr. Tania Ahmad examines 
the events surrounding the 12 May 2007 Karachi riots, the 
discourse of self-described “ordinary residents” who were 
compelled to stay indoors during the conflict, and their sense 
of indignation towards party politics and the political violence. 
Ahmad suggests that the shared experience of non-participation 
during the incident was not an instance of depoliticization for 
these residents, but rather a mode of political engagement. The 
sociality formed around discourses of non-involvement through 
domestic confinement was shaped by the denunciation of 
events occurring in the streets. 
The basic theme of this talk revolves around the aftermath of 
an episode of city-wide political violence in Karachi, Pakistan 
in 2007, where a discourse of indignation and denunciation, 
mediated in part by live television, was produced and claimed 
by precisely those Karachi residents who had retreated in-
doors as they anticipated the possible escalation of a political 
rally into a conflict over symbolic turf. I argue that their active 
non-participation in the political animosity, marked especially 
by their domestic confinement, constituted a form of politi-
cal engagement. This tentative and ultimately fleeting form 
of urban sociality points toward a potential emergent public 
that pitted self-identified ‘ordinary people’ against political 
conflict. I am trying to argue that even as ‘bystander tactics’ 
contribute to their own subjection to the very violence they 
avoid (which I have argued elsewhere), it is important that this 
tentative, fleeting and ultimately minimally effective sociality is 
not mistaken as merely a form of depoliticization. Instead, I am 
trying to think about it as a mode of participation, shaped by 
the discourse that represented staying at home during vio-
lent political conflict and waiting for the worst to be over as a 
shared experience.
 Given what has happened since, the events precipitat-
ing this public staging of indignation in May 2007 as a morally 
outspoken response to violence between political enemies 
have particular significance. In the ensuing four years, politi-
cal turf wars reemerged as issues of contention, both through 
regular target killings as well as through conflict that provoked 
an association with ethnic animosities. The peak of this vio-
lence was in August 2011, but allegations of ethnic conflict 
underplayed the alliances between smaller parties with mul-
tiple ethnic, religious and secular platforms against a powerful 
common enemy: the MQM (Muttahida Quami Movement), 
which I will talk about more later in my lecture. The allegations 
also failed to take into account that violence occurred in those 
areas where several parties competed over turf and, most 
importantly, that the claim of ethnic solidarity as a justification 
for violent conflict had not been consistently effective in Ka-
rachi’s history. The event I will discuss today constitutes a key 
turning point and will take you back to May 2007. This event is 
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a watershed for its failed attempt to recuperate ethnic differ-
ence as a justification for urban violence,2  and for the frank 
denunciations made by those who would cast themselves as 
ordinary residents—bystanders who were neither perpetrators 
and, only indirectly, victims. It reminds us that ethnic poli-
tics are neither consistent nor ubiquitous and, perhaps more 
importantly, that ethnicity is not always deemed a plausible 
explanation for political violence by people in Karachi. Instead, 
in this case, residents denounced one party directly, maintain-
ing that its actions could not be justified on a moral basis. 
Only infrequently do such denunciations become explicit: they 
contain clear allegations that identify perpetrators, transcend 
localized rumour and circulate in the public sphere. Here, live 
television coverage mediated the indignation of viewers and 
began to make a palpable, short-lived solidarity among people 
who claimed to be non-participants, ordinary residents and 
those who had stayed at home.
 An episode of city-wide unrest in Karachi in May 2007 
left over 40 dead, main roads littered with burnt vehicles, and 
ample news television footage of gunmen on rooftops and pe-
destrian bridges. On May 12, 2007, when a renegade judiciary 
collided with the scales of federal and city politics, the strate-
gic avoidance of party politics by Karachi residents slipped, for 
a brief moment, into a noisy clamoring of overt denunciations. 
Violence had spilled onto the main roads and was captured 
on live news television channels when the visit of the ex-chief 
justice, who had been dismissed by President General Pervez 
Musharraf, devolved into a series of armed altercations be-
tween opposition party supporters and those allied with the 
central government. The subsequent indignation of Karachi 
residents claimed the position of the non-participant as a sub-
stantive distinction shaped by the denunciations and domestic 
confinement of these residents.
 This instance of urban unrest led to the formation of 
a sociality based on the common experience of being driven 
from public space, where self-described ‘ordinary people’ 
were compelled to stay inside their homes until the worst was 
over. Residents articulated a rejection of party politics in fa-
vour of adamant claims for moral decency and compassionate 
humanity, contrasted with the ‘filth’ of ostensibly democratic 
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institutions. As fleeting as it was unprecedented, open vitriol 
against party politics was expressed, experienced and medi-
ated through live television coverage, which was outlawed by 
government censorship soon afterwards. These vocal critiques 
constituted a moment where angry residents interpellated mil-
lions of others who had retreated into the safety of domestic 
space on a city-wide scale. Such opinions were expressed by 
people with diverse class, ethnic and religious backgrounds, 
across those lines generally described and politicized as di-
viding them. Their tirade was powerful, especially given that 
sideways glances and oblique references had been the most 
common modality of criticizing political violence in the past. 
More often, when describing unruly political organizations, 
news media had feebly masked urban dynamics by refer-
ring anonymously to ‘a certain political party’. Although the 
elaborate landscape of political parties in Karachi, with vari-
ous ethnic and/or religious orientations, was considered with 
leery distaste, the party known as the MQM was by far subject 
to the most emphatic denunciations following the events of 
May 12th. Of the other parties, most of which had sided with 
the representatives of the dissenting judiciary, live television 
footage had shown that their workers had also been heavily 
armed. Nonetheless, the MQM occupied the most forcefully 
symbolic space in an imaginary of power, threats and the 
instigation of urban violence. Historically, the party had oper-
ated on a platform of class and linguistic identity. Although its 
name and official platform had changed since the late 1990s, 
the genealogy of identity politics remained embedded in its 
operations and in the ways that it had been imagined (Baig 
2008; Naqvi 2006; Verkaaik 1994, 2004). The denunciations of 
party politics explored here, and of the MQM in particular, are 
intended to complement the scholarship that focuses on the 
party as an institutional entity.3 In condemning the brutality 
of political parties in general, and of the MQM in particular, 
residents generated a discursive space constituted through 
negation.
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Context: MQM
The historical trajectory of the MQM has in recent years 
included involvement in municipal administrations and gov-
ernment, but also in what Tahir Naqvi (2006) has referred 
to as “counter-nationalism,” linked to a history of organized 
intimidation and armed turf wars. The acronym MQM stands 
for the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, or the United Nationalist 
Movement, which until 1997 was known as the Muhajir Qaumi 
Movement, or the Muhajir Nationalist Movement. The MQM 
is a Karachi-based political party, founded in 1984 with a plat-
form aimed expressly at a middle-class, Urdu-speaking iden-
tity, articulated in terms of a new ethnicity that collapsed Urdu 
speakers with the historical category of Partition-era migrants 
from India–muhajirs. Although the party claimed to mobilize 
muhajirs as an ethnic category, it is important to note that 
they did not do so consistently or uniformly. As Nichola Khan 
(2010) and others have noted, the descendants of Partition-
era muhajirs in Karachi are neither politically, religiously nor 
socioeconomically homogenous. Their political involvement is 
distributed among religious and secular political parties, and 
their degree of identification with the category muhajir, as it is 
used by the MQM, is highly variable. Nonetheless, the political 
platform of the MQM continues to signify a particular impetus 
to politicize muhajir identity in an implicitly ethnic register.
 Between 1985 and 1995, the activities of the MQM 
were associated with popular support, gruesome turf wars and 
ethnic conflict. In 1992, government attempts to suppress ur-
ban violence in Karachi resulted in Operation Cleanup, where 
for 29 months military forces occupied and purged the city of 
young men who were allegedly party activists. Following the 
military operation, the MQM’s radicalized side was tempered 
by being gradually incorporated and integrated into main-
stream politics through a series of coalitions and negotiations 
with the federal government. Beginning in 2005, the MQM 
led Karachi’s elected city government for six years, under the 
local government system that was in force until 2011. During 
that time, the party accrued a reputation for effective gover-
nance through infrastructural renewal and service provision. 
It also represented the majority of the city constituencies in 
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the Provincial and National Assemblies. Despite this newfound 
strategy of progressive moderation and municipal governance, 
the MQM continued to maintain antagonistic relations with 
standing historical rivals over turf and territory.4 The criticisms 
directed toward the party in the aftermath of May 12th ac-
cused the MQM of reiterating violent approaches to familiar 
animosities between political parties in Karachi and of using its 
municipal resources to plan and organize a partisan conflict, 
rather than exert restraint as responsible leaders of elected 
government.
The event
May 12, 2007 was supposed to be an experiment in foster-
ing national, public solidarity with the then-ex-Chief Justice 
of Pakistan, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, and the lawyers 
who supported him in the name of an independent judiciary, 
against the executive branches of government, specifically the 
regime of then President General Musharraf. After his summa-
ry dismissal by the President General in March 2007, Chaudhry 
became the figurehead around whom lawyers and opposition 
parties rallied for the independence of the judiciary from the 
executive branches of government. A series of rallies, each 
larger than the last, gave a loose community of lawyers and 
judges from different associations across Pakistan an unprec-
edented status as a collective of politicized actors. Newspapers 
and television screens were filled with images and stories of 
jubilant, defiant and rowdy lawyers, who called very loudly 
for Chaudhry to be reinstated as chief justice, arguing that his 
dismissal was unconstitutional. NGOs and other organizations 
joined in the opportunity to demonstrate the efficacy of civil 
society protest. 
 Political parties of the opposition—keen to capitalize 
on an opportunity to contest the current government, but also 
to support the principle of an independent judiciary—quickly 
lent their support to the ex-chief justice. The swell of crowds 
and array of familiar party flags waving in the background 
became visible features marking the momentum of Chaudhry’s 
supporters in Islamabad and Lahore. The images of those 
crowds exhilarated the people in Karachi, who hoped that civil 
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society and a rebellious judiciary would be able to bring trans-
formative change to a military government.
 On May 12, 2007 the ex-chief justice was invited to 
address the Sindh High Court in Karachi. He was never allowed 
to leave the Karachi airport, however, and returned instead to 
the capital, Islamabad, several hours later. That day, blockades 
were set up at the airport and along Karachi’s main arteries, 
gunfire was exchanged between members of political parties, 
and vehicles were torched as security forces looked on without 
interfering. Upwards of forty casualties were officially reported 
at the city morgues and ongoing rumours and reports were 
full of news of scuffles, injuries and deaths over the following 
week. Many residents did not venture out of their homes until 
several days afterwards. Ultimately, the events of May 12th 
brought about urban violence on a city-wide scale for the first 
time in twelve years, dredging up memories of past political 
violence in the process. Although indignation in the aftermath 
was directed at politically orchestrated violence in general, the 
majority of residents’ angry words were directed towards a 
single party: the MQM.
 The MQM was not only the current leader of Karachi’s 
municipal city government, but also one of the very few par-
ties allied with Pakistan’s ruling coalition, Musharraf’s party 
(prior to 2010, the Pakistan Muslim League–Quaid). Although 
the party was widely believed to have transitioned into a mod-
erate and progressive party at that time, the MQM was also 
primarily associated with an era of volatility and armed street 
violence in the 1980s and 1990s. The MQM gave the federal 
government a potentially threatening ally in Karachi, in whose 
presence it would be less easy to scathingly criticize Mush-
arraf’s administration.5  Through this role as well as through its 
historical precedents of grisly tactics of intimidation, the MQM 
was figured as the gatekeeper of the city. 
 Party representatives planned and held an MQM rally 
on May 12th, set up blockades inhibiting access to and from 
event venues, and draped banners painted in party colours 
over pedestrian bridges and billboards on the former chief 
justice’s procession route. Despite this ominous suggestion 
of competition in terms of territoriality and media attention, 
no one had anticipated that on May 12th, armed MQM party 
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workers would be stationed on these same overpasses and 
pedestrian bridges, ready to fire into the processions below, or 
to return fire. The chief justice’s procession through the main 
boulevard that connected the airport to the Sindh High Court 
was a highly contingent attempt at peaceful demonstration, 
consisting of supporting parties, civil society organizations and 
groups of lawyers. The symbolic threats made by the MQM in 
the days preceding the planned rally were played out through 
the presence of armed gunmen in the spaces overlooking the 
procession route, amongst demonstrators affiliated with vari-
ous parties and in neighbourhoods on the routes leading to 
the concurrent MQM rally.
 The first provocations were the cars and motorcycles 
waving MQM flags in the airport parking lot. Unidentified, 
but presumed-to-be MQM gunmen opened fire on a group of 
largely Pashtun lawyers as well as the Pashtun political party, 
the Awami National Party (ANP), in a nearby neighbourhood. 
The ANP was allied with Chief Justice Chaudhry and with their 
long-standing opponents, the MQM, on this occasion. Tele-
vision reports of this event seemed to instigate immediate 
outbreaks of street violence and shootouts in different parts 
of the city, notably along the chief justice’s planned, and now 
blockaded, procession route; in areas considered symbolic 
MQM strongholds, especially intersections near the proposed 
MQM rally; and in neighbourhoods where ANP turf bordered 
MQM turf.
 Two major turning points in live media coverage in-
tensified the explicit critiques articulated by news commenta-
tors, and thus mediated the sense of indignation as a shared 
experience. The first coincided with the moment that gunmen 
of all affiliations, who had originally been shooting at each 
other from rooftops, began bombarding the Aaj TV studios 
as cameramen and journalists reported from the balcony. 
The continued images of a crouching journalist, filmed by a 
crouching cameraman, as he angrily described the circum-
stances of being compelled to take cover, became iconic. The 
channel’s coverage of these events made the various hosts 
outspoken, critical and unguarded. The second major turning 
point was the candid commentary of news commentator, Dr. 
Shahid Masood, who on the evening of May 12th explicitly 
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and calmly, in impeccably articulate Urdu, stated baldly that 
violence was not an acceptable political strategy. There was no 
fear in his language, only the righteous moral high ground of a 
reprimand: violence would no longer be tolerated.
 I do not describe the events of May 12th in order to 
excavate violence as an object of analysis. Instead, I use the 
conjuncture it presents in order to mark a public, temporarily 
constituted and articulated in relation to it. This methodol-
ogy builds upon efforts that use spectacular crises as start-
ing points for investigating what they exclude, occlude and 
produce (e.g. Krupa 2009: 21; Daniel 1996; Tambiah 1996). 
In the aftermath of May 12th in Karachi, the denunciations of 
non-participants distinguished involvement in urban unrest 
from their domestic confinement. The indignation of residents 
in this framework thus presents a mode of sociality, enacted 
and staged by claiming domestic confinement as both a shared 
experience and an explicitly moral position.
 I want to take this issue in a number of different di-
rections. First, I’d like to emphasize that this argument is, in 
many ways, a response to Pakistani scholars who consider the 
vague category of the masses to be depoliticized, terrorized 
or fearful. Some of my previous work has tried to articulate 
the complex and ambivalent tactics of avoiding involvement 
in political violence that also operates as subjection; where 
retreating from urban public space to evade vulnerability 
also makes room for or cedes that space to the same conflict 
that many Karachi residents are trying to somehow get away 
from (cf. Ahmad 2011). Although several authors have written 
about a discourse of fear, I found that fear (khauf, darr) was 
almost entirely absent from the narratives I heard. Instead, I 
heard indirect modes of attributing actions to party workers 
alongside a discourse that emphasized a tactical navigation 
of a fraught social field. Second, I’d like to emphasize that the 
denunciations were iterated in an explicitly moral register that 
overlapped with the social distinction of middle-class respect-
ability. Any involvement in politics was filthy and implicitly low-
er-class, while the scolding exhortations to decency, humane 
compassion (insaaniyat) and sustaining civil relationships 
claimed a moral righteousness that I had learned to recognize 
as a sign of cultivated, articulate, well-mannered middle-class 
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aspirations. Here, respectability became a moral orientation 
that was invoked and addressed through what Michael Warner 
has referred to as the “social space created by the reflexive 
circulation of discourse” (2002: 90-92). Although I had heard 
the conjuring of an ‘us’ and a ‘we’ through appeals to being 
‘ordinary people’ on several occasions, in the aftermath of 
May 12th this claim seemed to accelerate, to pick up speed 
and to begin to suggest that it was grounded in shared experi-
ences that could be publicly staged.
 In addition, it is important to note that this sociality 
was tentative and emergent. It was by no means fully formed 
or explicitly articulated. It was a powerful, if fleeting, sugges-
tion. This is why I limit my discussion to the word ‘sociality’ 
rather than committing to any one of the plethora of stronger 
terms to describe solidarities, movements or constituencies. 
Ultimately, this faltering foray into public discourse receded, 
perhaps into more occasional references and everyday com-
ments, possibly due in part to the government-imposed 
censorship that had by June 2007 outlawed live television, im-
ages of politically sensitive violence and supposedly exagger-
ated criticism of the government in the media. Nonetheless, I 
suspect that the aftermath of May 12th generated a memory 
of how those people who stayed at home and waited for the 
worst to be over could imagine each other as a moral commu-
nity, connected by their disapproval of political violence, their 
active tactics of avoiding it, as well as their shared subjection 
to it.
Domestic confinement
Although dozens died on May 12th and thousands participated 
in rallies and events, millions of residents had stayed in their 
homes until the worst was over before tentatively venturing 
out to resume everyday errands and routines. In 2007, Kara-
chi’s population was estimated to reach up to nineteen mil-
lion inhabitants. If urban unrest is one social fact of May 12th, 
then the overwhelming absence in the city streets of the vast 
majority of residents is another.
 Staying indoors during periods of possible urban unrest 
was a common experience for many Karachi residents. Most 
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frequently, this was induced by strikes called by political par-
ties or last-minute ‘holidays’ announced by the government 
in anticipation of possible disturbances in the city. The strikes 
had variable effects, depending on how seriously residents and 
business people in a particular neighbourhoods judged the 
veiled threats of a party trying to enforce the closure of shops 
and the prevention of traffic circulation. In party strongholds, 
strikes would be observed for a few hours, whereas in more 
affluent areas, disregarding city politics was embedded in elite 
prestige. In general, life returned to normal by the afternoons 
once the symbolic point of the strike had been made and 
shopkeepers opened to compensate for the morning’s losses. 
Official ‘holidays’ were declared to minimize the presence of 
schoolchildren on the roads, to provide justification for em-
ployees not to go to work, and as a warning that the govern-
ment would not be held responsible for people who opted to 
venture into public space despite the subtle injunction not to.
 During my research in 2006 and 2007, friends and 
relatives repeatedly and forcefully insisted that I respect these 
official hints to stay out of public space, although I knew 
several colleagues who still went to work, attended classes, 
went shopping or attended their mosque, despite the warn-
ings. Their movements, however, took particular circuits and 
distances into consideration, where mobility within a neigh-
bourhood that seemed fairly quiet was easier to gauge. Their 
affiliations were also a consideration, where some judged 
that they could plausibly claim to support the striking party 
if asked. I was a single woman marked as a foreigner travel-
ing with a driver, who regularly traveled long distances across 
several neighbourhoods and whose immediate circumstances 
would be difficult to anticipate. Like many others, I also lacked 
the cultural capital to talk myself out of any situation or to 
know from experience when exactly, for example, university 
campuses would go into lockdown and what its implications 
would be.
 May 12, 2007 was a Saturday, a half-day of work for 
most people. Almost everyone I knew stayed at home, precipi-
tated not only by the ‘holiday’ announced by the government 
the previous evening just before midnight, but also by the 
several days building up to it. The news reported that political 
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rallies had been called by opposing factions on the very same 
day. The planned procession route of one group had been 
populated with banners of the opposing faction. In addition, 
the opponents had expended massive efforts to block off exit 
routes from the same procession route by installing metal con-
tainers at major crossroads. These were very threatening acts 
that foreshadowed a highly charged showdown.
 All evening and for the next few days, my relatives and 
I stayed glued to the independent television news channels,6  
which featured live footage, looped images, correspondent re-
ports, analysis and ample call-in responses from viewers. This 
heavily mediated experience was complemented by a steady 
stream of text messages: “Are you watching Geo?”, “Switch to 
Aaj”, “My mother won’t let me step outside”, “3 dead at Patel 
Para”, “All of this was planned by MQM”. Disbelieving phone 
conversations took place with relatives and friends in differ-
ent parts of the city—“How is it where you are?”, “Did you see 
what is happening at the airport?”—and with the two cousins 
who had gone to work that morning—“Please come home 
now”, “Why did you go?”, “You see, no one else was that stu-
pid”. Looking out the windows revealed a deserted neighbour-
hood. Even though our street was in an affluent neighbour-
hood well away from the main roads, I did not see any of the 
usual cars, pedestrians, vendors or groups of children play-
ing makeshift cricket. Members of the extended family from 
downstairs would intermittently come over to watch television 
with us and narrate the rumours and happenings they had 
heard about from the people they had texted or spoken with.
 Some stayed home all day, whereas others quickly 
retreated after encountering blockades or hearing reports and 
rumours while on early morning errands. In the days follow-
ing the event, I heard stories about a friend who had taken his 
father-in-law to the airport on his motorcycle, but had found 
the route home blocked on the way home and found himself 
trapped for several hours. I also heard stories about relatives 
of acquaintances who had tried and failed to convince security 
forces to let them through. The decision to stay at home or 
not was often influenced by upset relatives, and to leave one’s 
house could mean tense negotiations with the disciplinary 
strategies of alternately authoritative and tearfully pleading 
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household members. Because I lived with relatives through-
out my research, I was subjected to the ruthless intimacy of 
domestic surveillance on a scale that, I eventually learned, 
was comparable with other Karachi residents, whose relatives 
and friends occasionally forbade them to step outdoors. In 
this case, I understand my own domestic confinement on May 
12th, and the situated perspective thereof, as a form of par-
ticipant observation. In doing so, I draw on the commentary of 
Jessica Winegar (2012) on domestic experiences of revolution 
during the Arab Spring in Egypt, where she focuses specifi-
cally on her own participant observation of domestic confine-
ment to suggest that “fieldwork on major political change can 
and should take place in the home” (2012: 68). Like Winegar, 
I contend that domestic experiences are critical, not only in 
their potential to support or impede the publicly staged claims 
of dramatic events, but that excluding what she terms “the 
hidden majority” of those men and women who could not, or 
did not, go to Tahrir Square conflates the iconic occupation of 
public space with spatial assertions about “the true locus of 
transformative politics” (2012: 68, 69, 70). As such, consider-
ing experiences of domestic confinement during the events 
and aftermath of May 12th in Karachi is important not only for 
the purposes of documenting diverse experiences of political 
conflict, but also because it marked what I argue was an emer-
gent occasion where precisely that quality of domesticity was 
itself staged as a political claim.
 In addition, it is significant that the very regularity of 
the practice of retreating indoors, of relying on heavily medi-
ated accounts of public space through television and com-
municating with relatives, friends and neighbours, enfolds the 
violence of exceptional events into everyday family relations. 
This observation draws on the work of Veena Das and Nav-
eeda Khan, who emphasize that the ‘ordinary’ is where critical 
events are lived through the fabric of everyday experiences, 
which are shaped by the broader contexts that configure their 
potentialities (Das 1995, 2007, 2008; Naveeda Khan 2006, 
2010). By this, they mean that anticipating domestic confine-
ment as a result of publicly staged political claims, deciding 
when or whether to tentatively re-emerge to resume more 
conventional routines, and negotiating with pleading rela-
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tives, all shaped the quality of staying at home, waiting for 
the worst to be over. The centrality of television, texting and 
telephone conversations mediated the experience of cautious, 
self-imposed restrictions on mobility. More than a source of 
information, then, live television viewership marked the spec-
tator as not being in public space. Thus, the particular sociality 
constituted by watching news television mediated a surrogate 
perspective, where the domesticity of viewing emphasized 
a boundary between those who felt entitled to use public 
space outside their homes, on the main roads, and those who 
watched footage of that space from the safety of being in-
side. As events unfolded, the television journalists, reporters 
and anchors reinforced that distinction by vocally contrasting 
themselves and all other decent people who had retreated 
from public space from those who had occupied it and per-
petuated violent conflict.
Sociality of indignation
The outrage expressed by residents who had stayed in their 
homes, journalists and victims caught in the crossfire of po-
litical violence, fashioned a sociality articulated on the moral 
ground of non-participation and domestic confinement. The 
notion of this indignation as something shared, recognized, 
circulated and communicable drew attention to the formation 
of a fragile and tentative public constituted through a circulat-
ing indignation, through its expression, recognition and reit-
eration. As such, May 12th marked a significant, if short-lived, 
turning point that allowed angry words to be explicit rather 
than hidden in oblique references and abstract formulations. 
The direct quality of critique, as well as its specific directed-
ness towards an unruly MQM, sanctioned by the Musharraf 
government, indexed reflexivity for Karachi residents who 
were otherwise much more cautious.
 Live television broadcasts asked where the thousands 
of security forces, who had allegedly been deployed in Karachi 
for this day, were. My aunt was furious that the chief justice 
had supposedly refused the offer of helicopter transport to 
the Sindh High Court, where he was supposed to deliver an 
address. “Now so many people will die”, she said, “he should 
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have returned to Islamabad as soon as he realized what was 
happening”. My uncle paced through the house, saying that 
the MQM people were keeping the chief justice from leaving 
the airport. Later, photographs of flag-bearing groups of men 
on motorcycles in front of the airport, and magazine articles 
about shootouts on the airport grounds made this assertion 
difficult to refute. Scathing television commercials blended 
tracks of the national anthem with a hopeful patriotic poem 
wishing Pakistan progress and prosperity, laid over looped 
footage of politicians, people bearing different party flags 
running away or beating others, bleeding civilians and burning 
vehicles. Karachi University student Farid Bhai texted me to 
ask who I thought was responsible for all this. He did not agree 
with my feeble post-structuralist notion of a polysemic, con-
junctural causality, asserting instead: “All of this is planned by 
MQM.”
 Most significant was that although their reactions were 
shaped by media images and media discourses, combined with 
the self-imposed if cautious restriction of being domestically 
confined, these words anticipated MQM tactics that live televi-
sion only suggested. Their targeted denunciations and vocal 
disgust were apparent hours before the journalists were shot 
at, hours before the MQM rally was televised and hours before 
Dr. Masood bluntly stated his opinion on-screen. They drew on 
memories of violent tactics from the 1990s, and in the weeks 
following May 12th several people commented: “Yes, but it 
was nothing compared to 1992.” The audience combined the 
news provided by journalists with their own understandings 
and interpretations of contexts. My cousin returned from his 
brief morning stint at work to report that several dozen of his 
coworkers had camped out at the office because they didn’t 
think they could get home safely. Many of them lived in or 
nearby one of the many areas where there had been shoot-
outs, or where all roads crossed the blockaded procession 
route of the chief justice. Farid Bhai maintained that only the 
MQM, with its access to municipal resources and long history 
of organized street violence, could have mobilized the resourc-
es to arrange blockades on such short notice. My uncle, who 
had been a journalist for the Urdu press since the 1970s, made 
shrewd observations based on what seemed to me to be snip-
Asia Colloquia Papers Vol. 03 No. 02 // 2013
15
pets of information. I eventually realized that this audience 
had lived through long periods of state censorship and were 
thus accustomed to reading between the lines.
 Over the following week, I heard dozens of accounts 
from a wide range of Karachi residents. For acquaintances, in-
formants and television personalities, the orchestration by the 
MQM was obvious. Party activists were accused of setting up 
the blockades of cars, trucks, buses and metal containers along 
major traffic arteries and around the Sindh High Court build-
ing in the evening before May 12th. They were also perceived 
as having instigated violence through a series of provocations, 
which included opening fire on processions of the supporters 
of the ex-chief justice, both by targeting particular party del-
egations and posting gunmen on pedestrian bridges. People 
shared the stories about threats, blockades and rumours that 
they had heard through neighbours, relatives and co-workers. 
A common thread maintained that the MQM had been re-
sponsible for the violence and deaths through their prompting 
and, thus, instigation of the conflict.
 In the eleven months that I had already spent in Ka-
rachi, people had been much more wary; although they had 
been critical of the MQM in the safe spaces of homes, offices, 
through whispers and vague allusions, this bravery had been 
accompanied by furtive glances over shoulders and through 
windows, or comfortable conversations abruptly stopped 
when someone of unknown political affiliation came into a 
room. Now they shared stories that were never on television. 
Cars on Shahrah-e-Faisal had been flagged down and asked 
their political affiliation; if their answer was ‘wrong’, they were 
shot at point-blank range. Privately owned vehicles had been 
used for the blockades at the Sindh High Court. The political 
animosity was being allowed to slide into an ethnic register 
that pitted muhajirs against Pathans, who were associated 
with particular political parties, as well as with the bus driv-
ers’ union. MQM gunmen on pedestrian bridges had fired into 
procession crowds. Opposition-party gunmen had returned 
fire with semi-automatic weaponry. Party workers appre-
hended by rivals had been tortured. A man had been told that 
it was better to remove his trousers and shirt and go home in 
his underwear than risk being taken for a muhajir. This implied 
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that everyone else wore shalwar kameez, the loose traditional 
men’s garment associated with piety and labourers.
 Farid Bhai, himself an Urdu-speaker who occasionally 
attended MQM rallies for fun rather than out of sympathy, ex-
plained why the events of May 12th had come as such a shock. 
“People thought that the MQM had changed,” Farid Bhai said, 
echoing the commentary on television talk shows. For the past 
four years, he said, they had stopped taking bhattā (protection 
money), or at least they were demanding it with far less fre-
quency than before. “I thought they changed,” he reiterated, 
“once they entered the city government”. “But I was wrong,” 
Farid Bhai said listlessly, “they organized everything”. The story 
he told repeated the disillusionment of many Karachi residents 
who, prior to May 12th, had thought that armed conflict over 
political territory was a thing of the past. Farid Bhai was disap-
pointed and, like many others I had spoken to, frustrated.
 Other Karachi residents described the operation of an 
economy of intimidation. Reiterating an assertion common in 
interviews conducted after May 12th, a Punjabi resident aged 
in his 60s and from a middle-class neighbourhood seen as an 
MQM stronghold said that the party had been wrong to hold 
a rally on the same day as the chief justice. He explained that 
the MQM got votes on the basis of dahshat (terror) and khauf 
(fear). He did not describe this fear as paralyzing, but rather 
as something requiring particular tactics of navigation. He 
described how on that day, the bazaar on the main road had 
been closed, but the small shops in their neighbourhood, deep 
inside the maze of alleys, had eventually opened up. Then, 
he said, “laṛke motorcycles pe ā gaye the” (the boys on mo-
torcycles came) and told them to close the shops again. This 
happened three times—the shops would tentatively re-open 
and the boys would tell them to close. He explained to me that 
this was the type of hold that the MQM had in the neighbour-
hood—that they could threaten to shoot people and keep 
them scared and send boys on motorcycles to close the shops. 
People were afraid of them. However, I noted that they were 
clearly less wary about expressing this situation than they had 
been about naming the terror that moved them and identify-
ing the party by its name as well as its actions. In previous 
conversations, this man had made only the vaguest allusions 
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to the party whose turf he lived on. By describing his subjec-
tion in terms of the neighbourhood, through the shops and 
the residents who lived among them, he identified domestic 
confinement as something that many residents in the vicinity 
had shared. This was a tentative, emergent and yet unprec-
edentedly articulate enunciation of an implicit sociality—it 
began to imagine a ‘we’ and it named an agent enforcing the 
common experience of choosing to, but at the same time be-
ing compelled to stay inside. In sharing these details, openly 
and directly, sitting beside two open windows of his small 
home, he was contributing to the circulation of a broader criti-
cal discourse of indignation.
Conclusion
I have talked about this indignation as tentative, fleeting, 
emergent and, ultimately, the suggestion of a public constitut-
ed through the claim that domestic confinement was a shared 
experience, political violence was morally reprehensible and 
the MQM deserved to be denounced for its actions. This was 
an unusually explicit set of assertions among Karachi residents 
who were otherwise much more cautious and oblique in their 
criticisms. It located the possibility of a sociality in the distinc-
tion of morally decent persons who had been compelled to 
stay indoors and had not gotten involved in inter-party conflict. 
Rather than see only subjection and depoliticization in these 
practices, I would like to suggest that non-participation is a 
form of political engagement. That is, I would like to recuper-
ate rather than dismiss this range of specifically located, if 
ultimately ineffective discourses of indignation. I would like to 
do this very briefly, in three ways.
 First, scholars of the anthropology of democracy—
notably Julia Paley (2001)—have focused on the quality of 
participation as the object of ethnographic analysis. Non-par-
ticipation and domestic confinement are frequently taken as 
evidence of a lack of politicization, but political participation, 
I’d like to emphasize, is a relation. It is more useful to try to 
look for modes of participation than to consider a discourse of 
not-being-involved as the absence of it. The tentative, fleeting 
socialities of the sort that I have described may be marginal-
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ized in metanarratives of democratization, but it is precisely 
to a diversity of participatory modalities that we should look 
if we are ever to account for the millions who were compelled 
to wait until the worst was over before re-emerging into public 
space after May 12th.
 Second, these denunciations, as well as their domes-
tic confinement in moments of crisis, evoke Wendy Brown’s 
formulation that draws on Nietzschean ressentiment as “the 
moralizing revenge of the powerless” (1995: 66), where injus-
tice is articulated affectively through pain, injury, suffering and 
retribution:
Identities structured by such reactive pathos become “in-
vested in their own subjection” and “feast on generalized 
political impotence” (Brown 1995: 70-71). Focusing on Ameri-
can identity politics, she asserts that investing in liberal state 
structures of rights and grievances does not, by itself, guard 
against depoliticization. Furthermore, Brown asserts that this 
formulation of justice reinscribes bourgeois ideals that empha-
size educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility 
and relative protection from arbitrary violence (1995: 59-60). 
The denunciations of political parties that circulated among 
Karachi residents, in their exhortations to ‘ordinary decency,’ 
seemed to appeal to precisely the elements that Brown de-
scribes as depoliticized. Whereas Brown critiques politicized 
identities for their reliance on the very universal normative 
bourgeois ethos they aim to unsettle, Karachi residents appear 
to reject the very processes of politicization through a moral-
ized bourgeois ethos that distinguishes itself from a state ap-
paratus that both reiterates and defies a project of democratic 
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Ressentiment in this context is a triple achieve-
ment: it produces an affect (rage, righteousness) 
that overwhelms the hurt; it produces a culprit 
responsible for the hurt; and it produces a site 
of revenge to displace the hurt (a place to inflict 
hurt as the sufferer has been hurt). Together these 
operations both ameliorate (in Nietzsche’s term, 
“anaesthetize”) and externalize what is otherwise 
unendurable.” (1995: 68)
representation. I refuse, however, to relegate these denuncia-
tions of political violence to the unpolitical. They are impor-
tant, if limited, modes of critique relying on explicitly affective 
frameworks that both generate collective effervescence and 
underscore a fundamental subjection.
 Finally, I want to end with a point that draws on the 
work of Paul Kelly, whose work also focuses on ambivalent 
discursive formations that are tentative and difficult to place 
between subjection and active uptake. “Perhaps,” he says, “we 
can know discursive practices not only by the effect of their 
power, but also by the entailments as one seeks an effect. […]
The point here is not another (r)evolutionary ripening but the 
creation of the opponent, the transformation of the obligatory 
into the contestable” (Kelly 1991: 24-5). This is exactly where I 
want to leave you, with the suggestion that a particular discur-
sive moment in the aftermath of May 12th began to transform 
the idea of domestic confinement from something obligatory 
into something contestable. The particular condemnations 
of party politics in the aftermath of May 12th, not new, but 
suddenly audible and overt, fashioned a sociality that interpel-
lated imagined others through their circulation. Discourses 
posited non-involvement in urban unrest through domestic 
confinement as a collective experience and indignation as a 
participatory modality. Outrage, however, did not develop 
into movements following liberal forms of collective territorial 
mobilization through processions and dissent in public space. 
The casualties and injuries of May 12th had resulted precisely 
from an attempt to engage such fantasies of peaceful civil 
society protest; instead, the indignation that followed was 
located precisely in domestic confinement, framed as moral 
terrain that opened up the suggestion that being compelled to 
stay inside during moments of crisis could, perhaps, become 
contestable. 
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ENDNOTES
1 For their feedback and support on earlier versions of this 
material, I would like to thank Noman Baig, Mun Young 
Cho, Zhanara Nauruzbayeva, Kevin O’Neill, Archana Sridhar 
as well as Shahzad Bashir, Liisa Malkki, Purnima Mankekar 
and Sylvia Yanagisako. This talk was reworked thanks to a 
postdoctoral fellowship at the Jackman Humanities Institute 
at the University of Toronto, with the generous comments 
of its fellows, as well as faculty members of the Department 
of Anthropology. For their invitation to present this work in 
progress and for their prescient critical comments, I would 
like to thank the York Centre for Asian Research Urban 
Asia Colloquium series, especially Shubhra Gururani, Roma 
Chatterji, Malcolm Blincow and Othon Alexandrakis. My 
appreciation goes to Susan Henders, Ted McAinsh and Alicia 
Filipowich for their editorial help.
2This failure is significant because it marked a new strategy to 
re-animate ethnic animosity that seemed to gain traction in 
the ensuing four years. This developed through the ongoing, 
if sporadic, occurrence of target killings—with victims ranging 
from Shia doctors to Pakhtun shopkeepers—that were 
eventually, but not initially, reported in the news media in 
terms of ethnic and sectarian conflict rather than as a takeover 
of resources (qabza) or a way to provoke retaliation. On the 
conceptual significance of qabza in Pakistan, see Ewing (2010); 
Hull (2010) and Naveeda Khan (2012).
3 The research is based on thirteen months of ethnographic 
fieldwork in Karachi, Pakistan, between July 2006 and July 
2007. For more on the MQM, see for example Ahmed (1998); 
Gayer (2007); Kennedy (1991); Nichola Khan (2010); Naqvi 
(2006); Shaheed (1990); Tambiah (1996); Verkaaik (1994, 
2004). Print journalism between 1985 and 1996, notably in 
the Karachi-based weekly English-language news magazine, 
Herald, is especially informative and analytically rich. For an 
excellent account of the development and transformation of 
the MQM, including an overview of scholarship on the party, 
see Baig (2008).
4 Long-term rival political parties include the Jamaat-e-Islami 
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(JI), the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and Pashtuns as an 
ethnic and political category through the Awami National Party 
(ANP). Following federal elections held in January 2008, the 
MQM has been both in and out of a coalition with the PPP at 
both the national and provincial levels. At the municipal level 
(the City District Government of Karachi) the MQM remains in 
power.
5 By this, the MQM was considered threatening to anti-
government critics, which included members of the openly 
dissenting judiciary described above, as well as both its 
long-standing political rivals (who largely vocally supported 
the judiciary) and the civil society organizations who were 
compelled to voice their support of the dissenting judiciary. 
This, of course, reverberated with memories of the impunity 
with which both MQM workers and the extrajudicial military 
forces that had suppressed them acted as unpredictable 
agents of violence in the 1980s and 1990s. I also want to 
suggest that such precedents also symbolically mobilized 
a powerful, precisely because diffuse and indeterminate, 
sense of imminent street violence among Karachi residents 
who were not directly implicated in any active support of the 
dissenting judiciary.
6 Privatized since 2000, but officially broadcasting content from 
outside Pakistan (cf. Yusuf 2012).
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